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In June 2001, seven countries1 of South East Europe (SEE) agreed to conclude 
bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in order to develop their mutual trade and promote 
economic integration in the region. This approach implied the signature of 21 agreements, of 
which 5 already existed. The 21 FTAs are now signed and their implementation has started. 
In 2002, Moldova joined the SEE liberalization process. With 8 countries, the network will 
eventually consist of 28 FTAs. This note takes account of the two first FTAs signed by 
Moldova (with Romania and Bosnia Herzegovina) and therefore it includes 23 FTAs. But it 
will focus mainly on the agreements signed by the original seven countries. 
The paper provides an analysis of this network of 23 FTAs and studies their 
compliance with the principles of the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade 
Liberalisation and Facilitation (MoU) of June 2001. It also deals with how well the FTAs 
comply the trade coverage (Section 1) and other requirements (Section 2) of the MoU and 
suggests possible procedures to ensure implementation and proper functioning of the Trade 
Agreements in the short term (Section 3). 
 
1. FTAS’ COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 1 OF THE MOU 
As stated in the Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Liberalisation and 
Facilitation, bilateral FTAs are  to conform to a small number of principles regarding trade 
coverage and liberalization pace, compliance with WTO rules and content on specific topics. 
Newly signed agreements must follow these principles. Pre-existing FTAs are also to be 
reviewed in order to comply with these provisions (art. 1.3). 
 
1.1 TRADE COVERAGE 
Trade coverage is one of the main issues in any FTA, and not surprisingly the MoU 
sets some standards to be fulfilled. Article 1.2 has three requirements. Firstly, all quantitative 
restrictions and measures having equivalent effect must be abolished upon entry into force of 
the agreement (art. 1.2.1). Secondly, import duties have to be eliminated on 90% of the 
signatories’ mutual trade with a double criterion to measure it: 90% of the tariff lines of each 
signatory country and 90% of its trade value (art. 1.2.2). Lastly, liberalization should concern 
a large majority of goods upon entry into force of the agreement, with a transitional period 
for the most sensitive products that should not exceed 6 years (art. 1.2.3). 
Table 1 is a summary of the compliance of the 23 FTAs with these principles. Column 
1 indicates the FTA considered and Column 2 the signatory examined. FTAs and individual 
countries are mentioned in alphabetical order. This section analyses Columns 3 and 4 which 
present the trade coverage of the agreements as measured by the two MoU criteria: the share 
of liberalized tariff lines (Column 3) and the share of bilateral imports liberalized (Column 
4). 
                                                 
We would like to thank the British Department for International Development (DfID) for its generous support of 
this research, and all the members of the Trade Working Group of the Stability Pact for their help and support 
for providing the necessary information, and for their very useful comments on a first draft. 
1 Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia & Montenegro. 
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The trade coverages provided rely on two assumptions. First, no consideration has 
been given to the time schedule of liberalization. Table 1 thus considers as freed products 
those which are liberalized at the signature date as well as those to be liberalized within the 
next years (the maximum number of years being six). The liberalization pace is analyzed in 
Columns 5 and 6 and will be commented below. Columns 3 and 4 give a view of the 
liberalization attained at the end of the transitional period (the date of which can be found in 
Column 6). 
Second, a “freed line” is a tariff line of the Harmonized System classification (HS) at 
the six-digit level with no ad valorem or specific custom duty. Products on which tariffs are 
liberalized through the introduction of tariff-quotas (reduction or elimination of tariffs within 
quantitative restrictions) have been considered as not liberalized. The reason is that the 
degree of the remaining protection at the end of the period is unknown (one does not know 
the restrictiveness of the quotas at the end of the transition period). Quantitative restrictions 
reported in Column 7 of Table 1 don’t affect the trade coverage because they should be 
abolished (though the date of elimination is sometimes unspecified). 
The use of the HS nomenclature at the 6-digit level requires an aggregation of the 
national classifications (which are at the 8 to 10-digit level) that may have an impact on the 
results. For example: two national tariff lines, one freed and the other with a high duty rate, 
are aggregated in a single HS6 line with an average duty rate, and the resulting line is 
considered as not freed (because the duty rate is not 0%). The architecture of national custom 
tariffs could therefore introduce a distortion. Custom tariffs with uniform rates on large 
categories are not affected, but tariffs with a detailed discrimination of duty rates at the 8 to 
10-digit level could be distorted. But as the HS classification is harmonized only at the six-
digit level, it is not possible to analyze and compare the 23 FTAs in a different way. 
There was a further complication with the change in the HS nomenclature that 
occurred in 2002, the year of negotiation of most of the FTAs. The 2002 HS nomenclature 
has 5224 lines against 5113 lines in the 1996 HS classification. About 400 lines have been 
redefined in the new nomenclature with no perfect correspondence with the previous ones. 
Some agreements use the 1996 nomenclature and the most recent the 2002 nomenclature. 
There are also FTAs with a different nomenclature for each signatory. Trade and tariff data 
given by countries also put together the different classifications. We had therefore to develop 
our own “translation tool” between the HS2002 and HS1996 nomenclatures with a new 
source of approximation in the results. The change in the HS classification could also be an 
issue in the FTAs implementation when tariff codes for exemptions or concessions are given 
in the old nomenclature. 
If it is important to stress the technical limitations of the trade coverage analysis, it 
should also be borne in mind that it could only marginally affect the results of Table 1. Some 
agreements have been analyzed both in the HS2002 and HS1996 nomenclature and the 
difference in the results was less than 1 percentage point. Figures in Table 1 should therefore 
be considered as robust. The inherent technical approximations described above argue for a 
not too rigid interpretation of the 90% target. 
Column 3 in Table 1 shows that 15 FTAs out of 23 are above the 90% target or very 
close to the threshold on the first criterion (share of HS lines liberalized). The measure based 
on the value of imports (Column 4) leads to lower results. Only 9 FTAs are clearly above the 
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90% target or close to it. 
Combining the two criteria, Table 2 divides the sample of 23 FTAs into three groups 
of similar size: 
· Group I includes 8 FTAs with a high level of trade liberalization, well above 
the MoU requirements on both criteria. 6 of them record a full liberalization of 
both tariff lines and mutual trade (100%)2. 
· Group II contains 8 FTAs, which fulfill only one of the two MoU targets. 
Almost all of them fail to meet the import-weighted coverage test. The 
agreement between Romania and Serbia & Montenegro is very close to the 
90% target for the share of HS lines liberalized. It might be put in the first 
group, making group II more homogeneous. The 7 remaining FTAs are 
characterized by a significant number of HS lines liberalized but bilateral trade 
flows are relatively more concentrated in the lines which are not freed. 
· Group III is composed of 7 FTAs, which are under the 90% target on both 
MoU criteria. 
 
In Table 2, only FTAs are classified. There are sometimes important asymmetries 
between the trade coverage attained by each signatory to the same agreement. It generally 
stems from the MFN trade liberalization as far as tariff lines are concerned3 and from 
differences in the type of products exchanged in the case of the import-weighted criterion. 
But any difficulty to meet the MoU requirements has its main explanation in the FTA 
coverage, even if it concerns only one of the signatory. 
The results in Table 2 suggest a few comments. First of all, group III includes FTAs 
which are not very far from the MoU objectives, especially with regard to the share of tariff 
lines liberalized. The lowest coverage observed is 84.9% and typical results tend to be 
between 87 and 89%. These agreements are clearly in the reach of the MoU requirements. 
The second criterion is more difficult to analyze. To understand the results, it is 
important to take into account the low volume of trade between some countries (or the low 
volume recorded by trade statistics). When trade flows concern only a small number of HS 
lines, the results depend entirely on the liberalization of these few lines -- hence the 
(sometimes very high) difference in some FTAs between the overall share of imports and of 
tariff lines liberalized. Table 3 gives an overview of bilateral trade statistics used in the trade 
coverage assessment. Thirteen of the 49 bilateral imports reported in Table 3 have a value 
less than 1 million dollars with goods exchanged on a very limited number of HS lines (67 at 
most, out of a total of 5224 lines).  
The results seem also to be affected by the year chosen for import data, especially in 
the case of small trade flows. For example, in the FTA between Albania and Romania with 
2001 trade data, Romania has surprisingly a trade coverage of only 1.3%. It is mainly 
explained by not liberalized imports of tobacco products to an amount of 750,000 dollars, 
                                                 
2 In the agreement between Macedonia and Serbia & Montenegro, only 2 of the 5113 tariff lines are not freed 
(the trade coverage is nonetheless 100% when rounded and 99.9% with the second criteria because the two 
countries have trade flows on these two lines).  
3 Table 11 indicates for each country the percentage of HS lines liberalized at the MFN level. The percentage 
can be as high as 45% for Croatia or Moldova. It means that half of the liberalization effort required by the MoU 
has already been done at the multilateral level. 
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representing more than 90% of Romania’s total 2001 imports from Albania (822,000 dollars). 
In Table 1 based on 2002 trade data, the trade coverage is now 82% because different 
products have been imported by Romania this year. This example is a bit extreme, but it 
highlights the careful reading needed with regard to the results in Column 4 for countries 
with a low volume of bilateral trade. 
When trade flows are significant and diversified, the trade coverage in terms of 
imports is more in line with the first criterion. It suggests that as trade flows will increase 
between SEE countries as a result of the ongoing liberalization process, differences between 
the two coverage tests should progressively disappear, with the trade coverage converging to 
the tariff line coverage—hence suggesting the tariff line coverage as the key indicator. 
 
 
1.2 TRADE COVERAGE IN AGRICULTURE AND MANUFACTURING SECTORS 
In order to have a better idea of what distinguishes the three groups of FTAs, Table 4 
introduces a distinction between agriculture and manufacturing sectors, based on the 
Harmonized System classification (HS chapters 1 to 24 for agriculture, and HS chapters 25 to 
97 for manufacturing). Columns 4 and 5 report for each sector the share of HS lines freed 
(first MoU criterion) and Columns 7 and 8 the share of bilateral imports liberalized (second 
MoU criterion). 
 
An overall view 
Table 4 confirms that liberalization in agricultural products is what differentiates the 
three groups of FTAs described in Table 2. FTAs belonging to group I have either liberalized 
every tariff line without making a distinction between agricultural and industrial products 
(having therefore a 100% overall score) or almost fully liberalized the industrial goods but 
also included a significant number of agricultural goods in the liberalization process (more 
than a third of HS lines, having thus a trade coverage higher than 90%). FTAs in group II 
have also freed a sufficient number of agricultural HS lines to pass the first coverage test but 
the countries’ trade tends to be concentrated in the agricultural products not liberalized. 
Columns 7 and 8 show for several countries a clear-cut result of this type with 0% of 
agricultural imports freed and 100% of industrial imported goods liberalized. This situation is 
even more frequent in the third group of FTAs. But Columns 4 and 5 highlight that for the 7 
FTAs in group III, there are only a few concessions in agriculture (less than a third of HS 
lines freed) and it is also difficult to reach the 90% target in terms of tariff lines 4. 
On average, the trade coverage is lower when measured by the share of imports 
liberalized. This is especially the case with countries with small trade flows (there is only one 
agreement with important trade flows and the same kind of imbalance between agricultural 
and manufacturing goods exchanged), and it is related to the goods traded, which are mainly 
in the agricultural chapters of the HS nomenclature. The double criteria approach of the MoU 
requires that this type of FTAs should do more on liberalization in agriculture to fulfill the 
requirements. 
                                                 
4 Because agricultural products represent less than one fifth of HS tariff lines, the weighted average between no 
liberalization in the farm sector (0%) and complete liberalization of the industrial sector (100%) is 
approximately 86%, which is the kind of percentage observed in the last group of FTAs.  
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Among agricultural products, a comparison between Columns 4 and 7 also points out 
that goods traded are more likely to belong to tariff lines not freed. In 80% of the FTAs 
concerned, the share of agricultural imports liberalized is less than the share of tariff lines 
freed (disregarding the agreements with complete free-trade). Not surprisingly, barriers to 
trade in agriculture are mainly on the tariff lines with significant trade flows (see columns 4 
and 7 of Table 4). Some of these barriers have to be removed to fulfill the second criterion of 
the MoU. 
There is however a much more positive conclusion in Table 4. Column 5 definitely 
consolidates the idea of a de facto free trade area in industrial products among SEE countries. 
Every country has liberalized more than 98% of its industrial goods. 
Table 5 presents a more detailed sectorial analysis based on the International Standard 
Industrial Classification (an UN industrial classification)5. Columns 3 and 4 indicate the trade 
coverage measured with the two MoU criteria. But this time, an average of the 23 FTAs has 
been worked out 6. When there is a 100% coverage in Column 3 or 4, it means that the 
barriers to trade have been removed for all the products of the ISIC sub-group specified in 
everyone of the 23 FTAs. 
Again, agriculture has on average a low coverage, as pointed out before by the HS 
analysis. The ISIC decomposition shows that almost all sub-categories of HS agricultural 
products (chapters 1 to 24) are concerned: agriculture in the limited sense of the word 
(cereals, livestock production…), fisheries, food products (manufactured), beverages and 
tobacco products. 
Table 5 confirms that the trade coverage is on average higher (and above the MoU 
target) when measured by the tariff lines freed. Bilateral imports are on average liberalized at 
87.8%, below the MoU target. 
 
A focus on manufacturing sectors 
Table 5 also highlights the high level of liberalization in almost all manufacturing 
sub-sectors. The mining/quarrying sector and electricity (included in the manufacturing 
sector in the HS decomposition) are fully liberalized in every FTA. Of the 25 manufacturing 
industries reported in Table 5, 18 are in a situation of complete free trade and the 7 remaining 
categories have an average trade coverage between 97 and 99.9%. This is the concrete 
illustration of the “quasi free trade area” created in South East Europe by the network of 
bilateral FTAs. 
High trade coverage in manufacturing (between 98% and 100%) calls for an 
examination of the few products which are not freed. Table 6 gives a complete list of the 110 
industrial HS 6-digit lines excluded from liberalization. This list adds up the exemptions of 
the 23 FTAs, but no agreement has excluded all these lines. The lowest trade coverage in 
industry (98.5%, see Table 4) represents an exclusion of 68 lines. Moreover, 25 of these 110 
products are exemptions found in only one agreement and for only one signatory. On 
average, each product of Table 6 is excluded from liberalization by 7 signatories. 
The manufacturing sectors with limited exceptions to free trade are: textiles (but only 
                                                 
5 The ISIC classification has been revised several times. The ISIC rev.3 has new codes at the 3-digit level. We 
use the former codes (ISIC rev.2). 
6 The detailed results by sector and by FTA are in Tables 12 and 13 at the end of the paper. 
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raw fibers, which are considered by most FTAs as agricultural goods), wood products 
(natural cork), chemicals (mannitol and sorbitol, essential oils, albumins, gelatin…, other 
examples of products classified as “agricultural goods” in the FTAs), iron & steel (a few 
number of “flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel”), transport equipment (“motor 
vehicles for the transport or ten or more persons”) and “other industries” (where are listed 
products of animal origin like skins, feathers, bones… identified as agricultural goods in the 
HS nomenclature). It is clear that most of these goods are not sensitive industrial products 
ruled out from liberalization but rather products treated as agricultural in the FTAs and 
classified as manufactured in the HS or ISIC nomenclatures. With the exception of motor 
vehicles, these products are raw materials and not finished goods. 
 
 
1.3 COVERAGE IN AGRICULTURE 
As previously mentioned, we consider a line freed in the trade coverage analysis only 
if all trade barriers have been removed and products can be imported duty-free without any 
quantitative restriction. In some of the FTAs, concessions are merely granted under the form 
of a preferential treatment rather than by establishing free trade. The trade coverage results in 
Table 1 don’t reflect this liberalization effort, as only freed lines are reported. 
In order to take this preferential aspect into account, Table 7 details the concessions in 
agriculture of the different FTAs. Of the 23 FTAs examined, 6 institute free-trade in 
agriculture, 11 liberalize a limited number of HS lines and 6 grant only preferences, their 
“freed lines” (Column 7) being restricted to the lines already liberalized at the MFN level. 
These six agreements with no real bilateral liberalization in agriculture are not surprisingly 
the ones with difficulties to reach the MoU criteria (they are all in Group III in Table 2). 
There is a great variety of instruments used to grant preferences for agricultural 
products: tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) either duty-free or with a preferential duty rate, tariff 
ceilings, preferential duty rates without quota. Among these instruments, duty-free TRQs for 
a large quantity of the good considered deserve special attention. Column 8 of Table 7 
indicates that this type of TRQs concerns a limited number of tariff lines. Moreover, the 
figures in Column 8 show that trade coverages in agriculture would not be significantly 
improved by considering lines with duty-free TRQs as freed. The total number of agricultural 
lines in the HS 2002 nomenclature is 729. Taking for granted a 99% trade coverage in 
industrial goods, about 250 lines have to be liberalized in agriculture in order to fulfill the 
MoU criteria. Adding lines in Columns 7 and 8 is not sufficient for countries in Group III to 
reach 250. In other words, Table 7 results indicate that any real improvement of the trade 
coverage in agriculture implies the liberalization of a certain number of goods, as it is done in 
a majority of FTAs with lists of duty-free products. 
The key conclusion is thus that, with an almost complete liberalization in the 
manufacturing sector, only 35% of the agricultural HS lines need to be freed in order to reach 
the 90% MoU target. 
Table 8 presents a list of the most liberalized agricultural goods in the 23 FTAs. Each 
product in this list is liberalized by at least 54% of the 46 FTAs' signatories (at most 93% and 
on average 67%). The 282 HS lines thus obtained would allow to reach a trade coverage in 
agriculture of 38.7%. Such a coverage would be sufficient to fulfill the MoU trade coverage 
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criteria (when combined with a 99% trade coverage in industrial goods) 
As a result, this list of 282 HS lines could serve, for the countries missing the MoU 
thresholds, as a basis for further regional liberalization in agriculture in order to fulfill these 
criteria. It should however be pointed out that this list mainly includes agricultural products 
which are not produced in the region and so it does not constitute an adequate basis  for 
efficiency gains in the agricultural liberalization process. Therefore, an additional number of 
lines may need to be liberalized. 
 
1.4 LIBERALIZATION PACE 
The second part of Table 1 (Columns 5 and 6) deals with the liberalization pace of the 
FTAs. As previously reminded, the MoU requires that the import duties on a “large majority 
of goods” should be removed upon entry into force of the agreements and that the transitional 
period for the remaining goods should not exceed 6 years. In every agreement, Column 6 
reports transitional periods of 6 years or less. A majority of FTAs have transitional periods 
shorter than 6 years. For the last agreements signed at the beginning of 2003, the trade 
liberalization will be completed in 2008. 
The high share of tariff lines freed upon entry into force in most of the FTAs (Column 
5) suggests that the trade liberalization will be very significant in the region as soon as all the 
agreements are implemented. 
The seven FTAs signed by Bosnia Herzegovina are different regarding the 
liberalization pace. In these agreements, the liberalization is gradual and asymmetrical 
(except for Albania where it is symmetrical in the gradual approach). The partner country 
removes the totality of import duties (on the lines it has agreed to liberalize) upon entry into 
force of the FTA, whereas Bosnia liberalizes every product by reducing duty rates every year 
until they are abolished. The 25-26% of tariff lines liberalized by Bosnia from the 
implementation of its FTAs correspond to the lines already freed at the multilateral level 
(with 0% MFN duty rates). 
 
1.5 QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS 
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 1 show that there are still some quantitative restrictions in a 
small number of FTAs, on imports or exports. All the agreements signed by Serbia & 
Montenegro have quantitative restrictions on a limited number of products. Their abolition is 
clearly stated but the date of their suppression is not always given. 
The FTA between Moldova and Romania (signed in 1993, prior to the ongoing SEE 
trade liberalization) has also a significant number of quantitative restrictions but listed for the 
year 1994. Some of these barriers may have already disappeared. 
The abolition of quantitative restrictions should not be an issue in the implementation 
of the FTAs, as their number is limited and the agreements offer various methods to deal with 
sectorial economic difficulties in compliance with WTO rules. 
Another type of quantitative restriction is common in the FTAs7: the use of tariff 
quotas (TRQs) to grant concessions in agriculture (see section 1.3). It is questionable whether 
this practice is in accordance with the MoU, although quantitative restrictions in this case are 
                                                 
7 TRQs are generally not considered as quantitative restrictions because they do not limit the import quantity. 
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not used to create barriers to trade but to offer preferential duty rates on a limited quantity of 
agricultural imports. 
 
2.  FTA COMPLIANCE TO OTHER MOU GUIDELINES 
 The MoU specifies a few guidelines for the envisaged FTAs, and the compliance of 
the available FTAs to these guidelines is examined in this section. 
 
 2.1  AN OVERVIEW  
 Table 9 provides a broad framework for assessing whether the available FTAs follows 
the MoU guidelines. It suggests three main conclusions. First, the general impression is that 
the FTAs do follow the guidelines, although, as one could expect, pre-MoU FTAs miss some 
key guidelines, mostly those related to the “behind the border” agenda, that is, public 
procurement, services and TRIPs. Moreover, because of a very different environment, the 
FTA texts between Bulgaria and Croatia on the one hand, and Romania on the other hand do 
not follow the structure of the other existing FTAs. 
 Second, if one leaves aside the pre-MoU FTAs, all the other FTA agreements have a 
very similar or almost identical structure.. They are based on many common Articles, the 
order and the wording of which differ only at the margin, and are of similar length. 
 Lastly, the FTAs generally make reference to the WTO agreement corresponding to 
the topic they cover. They make an explicit reference to EC legal framework in only two 
cases, when dealing with the pan-European (or European) rules of origin and when evoking 
the harmonization of sanitary and phytosanitary standards with EC standards. 
 These observations reinforce a crucial conclusion reached when looking at the tariff 
and non-tariff reduction and elimination in the region: it would not be a difficult task to 
merge all these FTAs in an unique legal instrument for at least 19, out of the 23 available 
texts. Moreover, these 19 agreements involve all the countries, so that the 4 “marginal” texts 
involve only four countries (and three of them only marginally). 
 
 2.2  CONTINGENT PROTECTION 
 As often said, FTA agreements are worth the value of their provisions dealing with 
the instruments of the so-called “contingent protection” (safeguard, antidumping and 
countervailing measures). Too many or too loose provisions of this type may endanger the 
balance between market opening and domestic stability. Table 10 shows that a substantial 
portion of the FTA texts -- from one-fourth to one-third, as measured by the number of words 
-- are devoted to the various instruments of contingent protection.  They can be divided in 
three broad categories. 
 
Agriculture 
 First, there are the instruments specific to agriculture. The key one is the “special 
safeguard” which can include up to four key components: (1) mandatory (“shall”) 
consultation between the two Parties, (2) the test of “serious disturbances,” (3) possibility for 
a country “pending [an appropriate] solution, [..] to take measures it deems necessary,” and 
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(4) the fact that a measure “should” not go beyond what is strictly necessary to remedy the 
situation (the “proportionality” test). Table 10 shows that the last condition is not present in 
all the FTA texts. 
The special safeguard for agriculture is a source of concern because it imposes no 
robust counterbalance to the inevitable efforts of vested interests to close again the farm and 
food markets. Moreover, as many FTAs have substantial limits on trade liberalization in 
agriculture, one could not expect the regional farm trade to expand to such an extent that it 
will provide better prices and smaller volatility (these achievements would have required a 
deeper farm liberalization providing larger markets).  As a result, complaints on the existing 
liberalization should be expected to abound. 
 Reforming  this provision (see below) is all the more desirable because all but two of 
the FTA texts include an article on agricultural policy which states that trade liberalization 
commitments “shall not restrict in any way the pursuance of the respective agricultural 
policies” of the Parties, and that Parties “shall notify to the Joint Committee changes in their 
respective agricultural policies.” These provisions are ambiguous. Clearly, trade liberalization 
should not restrict the pursuance of the farm policy of a country, but it can impose some 
constraints on the instruments to be used for achieving such a goal. For instance, the Doha 
Round (as the Uruguay Round) should restrict the ability to use export subsidies. –I  It is 
essential to underline the fact that this restriction is good for the subsidizing country, since 
there are much less costly and much more efficient ways to support farmers. It may be too 
early to clarify the existing FTA provisions on agriculture, but it may be already time to think 
about ways to make this essential distinction between an agricultural policy and the 
instruments used for implementing this policy. 
Whole economy 
 The second type of contingent protection instruments are not sector specific 
(presumably, they could also be used in agriculture). They concern all the sectors producing 
goods, and consist in five provisions: a general safeguard, structural adjustment, re-export, 
balance of payments, antidumping and countervailing measures. 
 The general safeguard clause can rely on up to seven components: (1) the existence of 
an import surge, (2) the existence of serious injury, (3) the fact that the foreign and domestic 
products are similar or are (4) directly competitive, (5) the existence of serious disturbances, 
(6) the possibility of an injury limited to a region, and (7) the reference to the WTO safeguard 
provision. The first observation to be made is that not all FTA texts refer to the WTO, and 
hence take directly into account concepts such as “unforeseen events,” “causal relationship,” 
etc. Although the WTO texts are not always clear, the jurisprudence of the Dispute 
Settlement cases is becoming very useful in the day-to-day handling of the cases. Not to have 
an explicit reference to this jurisprudence is thus regrettable. Second, there are redundancies 
(serious injury vs serious disturbances; like- or similar products vs directly competitive 
products) which can only be a source of future troubles in terms of interpretation. Lastly, 
taking into account regional injury opens the door to very narrow vested interests, at the 
detriment of the general interest of the domestic consumers. 
 The provision on “structural adjustment” can include up to five key components: (1) 
the notions of “infant industry” or “certain sectors undergoing restructuring or facing serious 
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difficulties,” (2) a cap on “increased customs duties” (25 percent) to be imposed in the case 
of such infant industries, (3) a cap on the total imports (15 percent in value terms) which 
could be concerned by such tariffs, (4) the fact that this provision is limited to the 
implementation period of the FTA texts, and (5) a reference to the Joint Committee. All this 
language raises some serious questions since it opens the possibility of severe reversals of the 
desired liberalization. 
 The provision on re-exports and exports can include up to three components: (1) the 
possibility of taking measures limiting exports, notably in case of shortages, (2) the necessity 
to have non-discriminatory measures, and (3) the need to take measures “no longer than 
necessary.” This clause should also be a source of deep concern (particularly in agriculture 
where liberalization may be so limited that it may not be powerful enough to eliminate the 
volatility of the farm markets). However, experience suggests that measures on re-exports are 
rarely taken. An useful improvement would simply be to expand the legal capacity of the 
Joint Committee (see below). 
 The balance-of-payments provision refers to the GATT 1994 text and to IMF Article 
VIII. The current practice is not to use such a provision for trade purpose, and this provision 
may be of limited use. 
 The last type of instruments covers antidumping and countervailing measures, 
although only a minority of the FTA texts refer to countervailing measures. The articles of 
the FTA texts dealing with these instruments consist in a mere reference to WTO texts and 
practices. 
 
2.3  CONCLUDING REMARK 
 Being embodied in 23 FTAs, all these provisions on contingent protection, though 
based on almost identical texts, generate a serious risk that there will be 23 different ways of 
implementing these delicate provisions. Such a multiplicity of enforcement may open the 
door to a “race to the bottom,” with one case of loose enforcement setting the wrong standard 
for the whole region -- and the wrong signal to the world business community. 
 As a result, there are two possible solutions for getting the right balance -- and 
moving forward towards a “fully” regional free-trade area. As suggested above, joint 
interpretative agreements on the existing texts will minimize the risks of both divergent and 
economically-costly interpretations. Second, there is nothing which would limit the Joint 
Committees created by all the FTA texts to form a regional joint body for contingent 
protection matters, comprising the representatives of all the countries involved in the ongoing 
exercise. 
 
3.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SHORT TERM 
The following recommendations are for the short term (the coming year). Most of 
them rely on an effort to disseminate the information on the signed FTAs, and to build 
systematic information of their implementation and functioning. As a result, they are 
developed around the notion of a regional “information and notification package” (INP) 
which would be available on a website common to all the countries of the region. 
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Ideally, the INP would have two inter-connected pages, one devoted to the 
governments and one devoted to businessmen. The governments’ page would essentially 
provide the general information on the signed FTAs (their texts and their annexes) and the 
most precise possible information on the delicate points of the FTAs which have been pointed 
out above. The business page will serve as the basis for a (cross-) notification procedure, 
informing about the true difficulties met by firms from the region and from the rest of the 
world when they are using the FTAs. (Cross-notification would ensure that the most pressing 
issues from the business perspective will be covered in totality and dealt with in priority.) The 
following recommendations try to minimise the administrative burden for the governments, 
and to facilitate the participation of the business people. 
 
3.1.  TARIFF QUOTAS 
The above analysis of the FTAs treats all tariff quotas (TRQs) as a barrier. TRQs with 
a (preferential) duty rate within the quota limits are undoubtedly trade barriers. This approach 
may seem quite strong for duty-free TRQs, but it is based on two alternative situations. If one 
assumes that the pre-FTA level of protection was low, the frequently observed absence of any 
trade for the tariff lines under TRQ before the FTA signature suggests that there was no need 
for quantitative limits on market access. If, alternatively, one assumes that the pre-FTA level 
of protection was high (so that potential trade was already severely constrained), the small 
amount of quantities allowed under most of the TRQs suggests that the potential expansion of 
trade will rapidly meet the constraints imposed by the quota component of the TRQs. In both 
cases, TRQs are trade barriers. 
 The problem may be compounded by the following situation. For each country, it 
happens in a certain number of cases that TRQs are found in some FTAs, but not in all the 
FTAs signed by the country in question (for instance, as underlined above, six FTAs institute 
free-trade in agriculture). This situation is an incentive to trade deflection: some quantities 
entering free from country A into country B could be diverted to country C, if country C has 
imposed a TRQ only on imports from A. Of course, rules of origin are made for addressing 
such an issue. It is thus plausible that, in order to prevent such a trade deflection, particularly 
complex and cumbersome rules of origin are imposed by country C on imports from both 
countries A and B. 
 Lastly, there is no information in the various FTAs on how the quota component of 
the TRQ will be allocated between the various importers and exporters. Such an information 
is decisive for assessing the ultimate protectionist capacity of the instrument. For instance, 
the usual rule “first come, first served” favors quick and well informed operators, who are not 
necessarily the most efficient producers. This remark is important for two reasons. Firstly, it 
suggests that incompletely fulfilled TRQs are not a sure sign of a generous quota component 
of the TRQs, a problem to be dealt within the coming years. Secondly, it reminds everybody 
that quotas have a major negative consequence: they create rents for those who get them 
(again, not necessarily the most efficient producers) and they deprive governments of tariff 
revenues. 
 Such a complex situation makes it impossible to assess whether TRQs are, and will 
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be, binding with great facility and certainty. What is important for solving this issue is to 
improve as quickly as possible information on the TRQ functioning. Hence, we recommend 
the three following procedures. 
1. The Working Group could issue an initial official document listing all the TRQs, with 
precise information on three aspects: 
a. the tariff component (whether tariffs are ad valorem or specific, their level 
before the FTA and after the transition period, etc.) at the most detailed level 
of the tariff classification. Based on current information, all the tariff-quotas 
created by all the FTAs involve 360 tariff lines at the 6-digit level. 
b. the quota component: its size, and the procedure used for giving the import 
licenses.  
c. data on trade flows for the years 1999-2002. 
This information should be regularly updated, and posted on the governments’ page of 
the suggested INP website. 
2. On a regular, and as frequent as possible, basis, the Customs of all the Trade Working 
Group members would report data on the demands for licenses, and on the imports 
effectively done (the two figures may not coincide). The level and speed at which the 
quota components are filled will give a first -- though very crude because depending on 
the license procedure -- idea of the real protection impact of the measure. 
3. A very useful additional information will be provided by businessmen notifying their 
difficulties for getting licenses (for instance, too cumbersome rules). 
After a few months, it will be possible to have a first idea of the TRQs which may be binding 
and those which may not be. 
To the extent that the above analysis of the TRQs assumes that all of them are 
binding, there may be a need for immediate action for the countries having signed FTAs not 
meeting the 90 percent threshold.  In the other cases, governments could consider two 
alternatives for improving the situation: 
1. For the TRQs appearing as not binding, governments could envisage both a rapid 
elimination of the quota and tariff components, and shift the goods in question into the 
main list of the products to be liberalised. 
2. For the TRQs appearing to be binding, two typical cases need to be considered.  If the 
quota is small (in terms of domestic consumption), any further liberalization should 
consist in reducing the over-quota tariff (it should not aim to expand the quota 
component).  If the quota component is large relative to domestic consumption, further 
liberalisation should consist in a fast relaxation (increase) of the quota.8 
                                                 
8 The reason for these choices is as follows.  A TRQ creates rents, that is, people interested in its survival 
because they benefit from it.  For instance, let us assume a world price of 100 euros,  and a MFN tariff of 20 
percent, except on the quota where the tariff is nil.  Importers having licenses to import under the quota 
component will price the imported goods at 120 euros (or slightly less), keeping the 20 euros (MFN tariff-
equivalent) for them as a rent by unit.  If the quota is small, any incremental increase of the quota will not 
change the domestic price (there will still be quantities imported under the full tariff), but it will expand the 
quantities on which importers can get the 20 euro rent by unit.  Consumers will get no benefits from increasing 
the quota component, and government will loose money (the MFN tariff revenues formerly levied on the 
additional quantities under quota become rents).  By contrast, if the government decides to decrease the MFN 
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3.2  NON-TARIFF BARRIERS 
The procedure suggested for tariff-quotas could be used for all the conceivable non-
tariff barriers (NTBs), be they pure quantitative restrictions, minimum prices, tariff 
surcharges, etc.  The problem is to limit the burden of such a work for the governments’ side.  
As a result, attention should focus on a priority list of the most damaging NTBs -- the “hard-
core” NTBs.  The Trade Working Group could easily make such a list by using the existing 
lists from WTO or UNCTAD sources, and by choosing the hard-core NTBs based on their 
extensive knowledge of the most relevant barriers in the region. 
 All the recommendations suggested for the TRQs for the government component of 
the INP could then be applied to the chosen hard-core NTBs. There may need to be some 
adjustments. 
 By contrast, there is no reason to impose limits on the scope of the NTBs for which 
businessmen will be allowed to notify. In fact, businessmen may have a different view of 
what they see as hard-core NTBs than trade officials. A possible difference about the scope of 
the hard-core NTBs opens the question of whether governments should or shall react to the 
notifications about NTBs that they have not listed as hard-core, but that businessmen have 
selected as such. 
 
3.3  CONTINGENT PROTECTION: ANTIDUMPING AND ANTISUBSIDY 
The looseness of the FTA texts on this topic, and the great danger that it may create in 
the coming years, has been shown above. A first remedy could be to re-draft the existing FTA 
texts in order to put them more in accordance with WTO rules. However, this option is not 
likely to show a positive cost-benefit balance. The costs in terms of renegotiation may be 
high, and the benefits limited because the WTO regulations on contingent protection are 
notoriously defective and are lacking basic economic sense.  Hopes that the Doha Round will 
address these flaws successfully are slim. 
An alternative remedy, more pragmatic, should be considered.  If they work well, 
FTAs will increase the market shares of the producers from the region in (almost) each 
country of the region. What governments want is that these increased market shares are not 
accompanied by social and political turmoils. The easiest way to make a compromise 
between these two partly conflicting objectives is to use the “de minimis” clause, that is, the 
threshold under which a measure will not be taken against imports, even if these imports are 
allegedly dumped or subsidised. 
 In this perspective, a code of interpretation of the FTA existing provisions on 
antidumping and antisubsidy measures could be drafted by the Trade Working Group. The 
main provisions of this code could be, among others: 
1. A reminder that all of the countries of the region being (or in the process of being) 
                                                                                                                                                        
tariff from 20 to 10 percent, the domestic price will decrease from 120 to 110 euros (consumers will be happy) 
and the rents will be reduced (making the rent-seekers less induced to lobby for the survival of the TRQ).  If the 
quota is large relative to the domestic consumption, then an increase of the quota could quickly free the whole 
market, eliminating the rents and benefiting the consumers. 
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WTO members, all the WTO procedures on antidumping and antisubsidy should be 
respected. 
2. A precise and progressive programme of increasing the de minimis thresholds. For 
instance, the threshold for imports from the region would be, say, 5 percent in 2003, 10 
percent by the year 200-- (date to be negotiated), 20 percent by the year 200-- (date to 
be negotiated), etc.9 At one point in the future, the threshold would become so high that 
the use of antidumping and antisubsidy measures between the countries of the region 
would loose any attraction, and could be eliminated (de jure or de facto), meaning that 
a fully integrated regional market would have been achieved. 
3. This use of the threshold approach requires (at least) two additional decisions. First is 
whether the threshold will be applied to the imports of each country of the region, or 
whether it would be apply to the aggregate sum of the imports of the region.  Of course, 
the first solution is preferable. Second is whether the threshold will be defined, as in the 
WTO context, in terms of import shares (that is, the share of the allegedly dumped or 
subsidised imports in total imports).  Import shares are not the most economically 
sound indicator:  total imports may be very small, compared to domestic consumption, 
meaning that measures could be taken even if the alleged imports represent a tiny 
percentage of the domestic consumption.  The correct basis for the threshold is the 
share in domestic consumption, that is, the share of the imports under investigation in 
total domestic consumption (the sum of imports and the domestic production sold in the 
country) of the good in the economy in question. 
4. A normalized spreadsheet could be designed for calculating the thresholds in order to 
ensure a homogeneous enforcement of the code of interpretation. In fact, this 
spreadsheet could usefully include additional, economically sound information on some 
key aspects of the investigations done in these procedures. For instance, it would be 
very useful to provide, on a routine basis, the information gathered during the 
investigation on the market shares of the foreign defending firms and of the domestic 
complaining firms (all in terms of domestic consumption). Such information will shed 
an useful light on the level of competition in the market in question. A lot of 
antidumping cases consist in keeping or creating market power. Announcing in advance 
that such an information will be routinely provided will protect the authorities from the 
pressures of firms having such an intent, while keeping the procedures available for 
firms really in difficulties (the “raison d’être” of these procedures).  In other words, it 
will help the authorities to keep antidumping and antisubsidy measures under tight 
control. 
All these recommendations are necessary, but they do not address the key problem mentioned 
above, that is, the serious risks of substantial differences in the bilateral implementation of 
contingent protection. Divergences could emerge at every step of the procedures, possibly 
creating quite a chaotic situation in the region after a while. Of course, one could hope that 
after a while, regional “norms” would emerge. However, such a hope could be serious only if 
                                                 
9 One should check whether this approach could be attacked as discriminatory under WTO rules. 
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there is, right from the start, a deep understanding of what should be the common behavior. 
 For ensuring this initial condition, the most straightforward, and probably the best, 
approach would be a “Joint Regional Committee” dealing with all the contingent protection 
cases covered by the FTAs under the supervision of the Trade Working Group.  There are 
endless variations on the form that such a Committee could take.  For instance, it may not be 
a permanent body, but simply consist in joint sessions of all the bilateral committees in 
charge of monitoring the implementation of the FTAs.  A stronger version would be that the 
necessary investigations may be left to the authorities of the country where the case has been 
lodged, but under the close supervision of the Joint Committee that will take the decision on 
the measures to be adopted. Another possibility would be that the Joint Committee (or the 
joint sessions of the bilateral committees) will simply work as an Appelate Body. 
 
3.4  CONTINGENT PROTECTION: SAFEGUARDS 
 Safeguard measures could be subjected to the same recommendations as those dealing 
with antidumping and antisubsidy. But four additional specific recommendations are 
suggested. 
1. Two improvements of the special safeguard in agriculture could be envisaged. First, it 
seems reasonable to introduce the proportionality test (the fourth condition) in all the 
FTA texts which do not contain such a clause – or alternatively in a joint code of 
interpretation signed by all the countries. Second, a better definition of the second 
condition (serious disturbances) could be worked out, and again included in the joint 
interpretation code. 
2. Concerning the general safeguard provision, improvements of the existing clause could 
include (1) a systematic reference to the WTO text and jurisprudence, (2) a 
simplification of certain terms (keep only similar products and serious injury) in a joint 
interpretative agreement to be established, and (3) soften or eliminate the reference to 
regional injury. 
3. Concerning the structural adjustement provision, improvements could (1) include a 
joint interpretative agreement stating that the caps on the measures should be reduced 
over time (for instance, additional tariffs taken during the second year of 
implementation could not be higher than 10 percent, and the total amount of imports 
involved could not be larger than 8 percent, with stricter caps for the third and fourth 
years of implementation), (2) eliminate the notion of infant industry simply because 
tariffs are not the best instrument to deal with such an issue, and (3) to expand the legal 
capacity of the Joint Committee to limit the use of such a provision. 
4. Concerning the balance-of-payments provision, an useful improvement would, once 
again, be to expand the legal capacity of the Joint Committee. 
 
3.5  ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE FTAS 
FTAs should be subjected to an annual review.  In order to keep this exercise within 
doable limits and to maximise its benefits, it may be useful to consider the option of a joint 
review at the regional level.  This annual event would allow improving the visibility and the 
credibility of the FTAs for the businessmen from the region and from the rest of the world. In 
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fact, this exercise will not require much additional work from the authorities, in addition to 
the above recommendations.  This is because all the delicate points (tariff-quotas, non-tariff 
barriers, and contingent protection) would have been already discussed in the appropriate 
fora. 
 There are two additional main topics for such a joint review.  First is the review of the 
tariff and non-tariff liberalisation, that is, checking whether countries have been respectful of 
the deadlines and other provisions included in the treaties.  This event will offer the 
opportunity to provide a joint reaction to all the notifications and other requests coming from 
the business community during the past year. 
 Second is the discussion of “systemic improvements” in the regional trade regime.  
For instance, this event would give the opportunity to the signatories to accelerate their 
liberalisation programmes (that has been the case for the European Community during the 
1960s).  It could also address longer term issues. 
 By definition, the annual review should be done at the Ministerial level.  But it should 
be also prepared at the appropriate level.  The current Trade Working Group of the Stability 
Pact is the natural body to prepare these annual reviews. 
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
Table 11 highlights the existence of a liberalization process at the multilateral level that 
complements the regional trade liberalization.  Looking at SEE tariffs with respect to the rest 
of the world suggests two important points for the implementation of the FTAs.  First, the 
higher the MFN tariffs are, the less likely the SEE consumers will gain from the free trade 
areas.  For illustration case, assume a simple case where the producers in one SEE country 
are inefficient, and thus eliminated by competitors from other SEE countries.  If the 
importing SEE country maintains high MFN tariffs, its consumers may still pay high prices 
for the goods produced in the other SEE countries.  This issue is likely to emerge during the 
implementation process.  Second, MFN tariffs of SEE countries seem often close—many of 
them differ by 5 percentage points or even less.  In such cases, incentives to divert trade are 
probably small—a good news from the implementation point of view. 
 
                                                 
Table 1. Summary of FTAs compliance with article 1.2 of the MoU
FTA
(year of 
entry into 
force)
Country Share of HS lines liberalized (%)
Share of mutual 
trade liberalized 
(%)
Share of HS lines 
freed upon entry 
into force (%)
End of 
transitional 
period
Number of lines 
with QRs upon 
entry into force
Year of abolition?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Albania 91,0 91,7 4,7
Bosnia Herzegovina 93,0 88,6 26,6
Albania 86,2 70,0 83,7
Bulgaria 87,0 83,8 72,4
Albania 85,7 95,8 82,0
Croatia 87,4 53,2 84,0
Albania 91,6 79,5 87,4
Macedonia 93,1 89,6 59,8
Albania 85,8 99,6 83,4
Romania 86,5 82,0 82,9
Albania 89,7 37,5 85,9 - -
Serbia & Montenegro 89,3 89,1 88,6 25 Not specified
Bosnia Herzegovina 91,5 75,9 27,2 1 Jan. 2005
Bulgaria 88,9 95,6 88,9 entry into force
Bosnia Herzegovina 100,0 100,0 25,6 1 Jan. 2004
Croatia 100,0 100,0 100,0 entry into force
Bosnia Herzegovina 100,0 100,0 25,6 - -
Macedonia 100,0 100,0 99,9 2 31 Dec. 2003
Bosnia Herzegovina 100,0 100,0 26,2
Moldova 100,0 100,0 44,9
Bosnia Herzegovina 91,8 83,7 27,1 1 Jan. 2005
Romania 88,7 89,9 88,7 entry into force
Bosnia Herzegovina 100,0 100,0 25,6
Serbia & Montenegro 100,0 100,0 99,9
Bulgaria 93,9 95,6 69,3
Croatia 94,5 91,7 88,0
Bulgaria 87,7 89,1 40,2
Macedonia 86,3 87,2 82,1
Bulgaria 94,6 98,0 71,4
Romania 94,6 94,4 79,7
Bulgaria 88,4 87,4 80,8 - -
Serbia & Montenegro 87,6 94,0 78,1 25 31 Dec. 2004
Croatia 99,1 87,8 98,3 -
Macedonia 99,3 88,8 99,1 2 31 Dec. 2003
Croatia 88,1 47,8 87,9
Romania 87,6 71,4 87,5
Croatia 94,7 90,3 89,1 5 (on exports)
Serbia & Montenegro 93,9 77,6 91,1 25
Macedonia 84,9 86,0 83,3
Romania 86,3 59,8 85,6
Macedonia 100,0 99,9 97,4 62 (on exports)
Serbia & Montenegro 100,0 99,9 98,7 129 (on exports)
Moldova 100,0 100,0 100,0 221 (on exports)
Romania 100,0 100,0 100,0 109 (on exports)
Romania 88,8 89,9 86,2 - -
Serbia & Montenegro 88,5 96,9 86,9 25 31 Dec. 2005
-
1 Jan. 2007 Not specified
1 Jan. 2005 -
1 Jan. 2002 -
ALB-ROM
(2003) 1 Jan. 2007 - -
1 Jan. 2007
1 Jan. 2007
1 Jan. 1999 Not specified
entry into force Not specified
19. CRO-S&M(2003)
-MAC-ROM(2003)
21.
20. -
23. ROM-S&M(2003)
22. MOL-ROM(1994)
17. 1 Jan. 2005(revised FTA)
1 Jan. 2007
18. 1 Jan. 2005
16. BUL-S&M(2003)
1. 1 Jan. 2008 - -
BIH-CRO
(2001)
Quantitative restrictions (art. 1.2.1)
ALB-BIH
(2003)
ALB-CRO
(2003)
-
Trade coverage (art. 1.2.2) Liberalization pace (art. 1.2.3)
1 Jan. 2007 -
-
-
-
MAC-S&M
(1996)
BIH-S&M
(2002)
BUL-MAC
(2000)
CRO-MAC
(1997)
CRO-ROM
(2003)
ALB-MAC
(2002)
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
12.
BIH-MOL
(2003)
BIH-ROM
(2003)
1 Jan. 2004 18(QR on exports) Not specified
1 Jan. 2006 -
-
2. ALB-BUL(2003) -
9.
7. BIH-BUL(2003) -
1 Jan. 2007
1 Jan. 2005
-
1 Jan. 2008
1 Jan. 2008
10.
11.
BIH-MAC
(2002)
6. ALB-S&M(2003)
3.
4.
5.
Data: national statistics, bilateral imports 2002 (2001 for Serbia&Montenegro). Imports for Bosnia Herzegovina are replaced by partner country's exports. When missing,
bilateral imports are replaced by world imports.
14.
13.
8.
-
BUL-CRO
(2002) 1 Jan. 2003
15. BUL-ROM(1999) -
Table 1
Table 2. Results of the trade coverage analysis with both MoU criteria
Tariff-based 
indicator under 90%:
Import-based 
indicator under 90%:
ROM-S&M ALB-BIH
ALB-MAC
ALB-S&M
BIH-BUL
BIH-ROM
CRO-MAC
CRO-S&M
MAC-S&M
MOL-ROM
BUL-S&M
CRO-ROM
ALB-ROM
BUL-MAC
MAC-ROM
Free Trade Agreements
BIH-CRO
BIH-MAC
BIH-MOL
BIH-S&M
BUL-CRO
BUL-ROM
ALB-BUL
ALB-CRO
Group I
(8 FTAs)
Group II
(8 FTAs)
Group III
(7 FTAs)
Agreements fulfilling 
only one of the two 
90% trade coverage 
criteria
Agreements under 
both 90% trade 
coverage criteria
Agreements fulfilling 
both 90% trade 
coverage criteria
Table 2
Table 3. Bilateral imports of SEE countries in 2002 (value, 1000USD) and number of HS 6-digit lines with products traded
                          from:
 Imports of: Albania
Bosnia 
Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Moldova Romania
Serbia & 
Montenegro
Albania 70322 lines
29 086
758 lines
28 527
107 lines
14 722
599 lines
1 156
9 lines
15 530
112 lines
774
67 lines
Bosnia Herzegovina 7413 lines
10 608
499 lines
704 119
3104 lines
18 285
451 lines
0
0 lines
14 598
187 lines -
Bulgaria 14538 lines
879
62 lines
14 051
165 lines
17 910
523 lines
3 716
92 lines
161 561
885 lines
23 612
521 lines
Croatia 26536 lines
166 293
1565 lines
15 381
465 lines
66 709
602 lines
1 299
70 lines
44 663
610 lines
53 145
1194 lines
Macedonia 93156 lines
13 240
285 lines
114 054
1886 lines
54 551
1014 lines
129
5 lines
8 107
207 lines
165 924
1973 lines
Moldova - 163 lines - - -
126 230
1914 lines -
Romania 55 lines
587
44 lines
148 293
1416 lines
5 707
266 lines
1 351
59 lines
50 253
457 lines
25 426
426 lines
Serbia & Montenegro 77825 lines
129 531
1237 lines
138 342
959 lines
172 327
1846 lines
126 186
967 lines -
152 827
468 lines
Data: national statistics, value of bilateral imports 2002 (2001 for Serbia&Montenegro). Imports for Bosnia Herzegovina are replaced by partner country's exports.
"-" means that data are missing.
Table 3
Table 4. Trade coverage in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors
FTA Country
All products Agriculture Manufacturing All products Agriculture Manufacturing
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. ALB-BIH Albania 91,0 38,8 99,5 91,7 59,5 100,0
Bosnia Herzegovina 93,0 51,4 99,7 88,6 0,0 100,0
2. ALB-BUL Albania 86,2 5,1 99,4 70,0 0,0 100,0
Bulgaria 87,0 11,0 99,4 83,8 0,0 100,0
3. ALB-CRO Albania 85,7 5,1 98,6 95,8 0,0 100,0
Croatia 87,4 14,2 99,0 53,2 0,0 100,0
4. ALB-MAC Albania 91,6 41,9 99,5 79,5 19,4 99,9
Macedonia 93,1 52,0 99,6 89,6 65,0 100,0
5. ALB-ROM Albania 85,8 5,3 98,9 99,6 80,4 100,0
Romania 86,5 10,3 98,9 82,0 0,0 100,0
6. ALB-S&M Albania 89,7 29,4 99,4 37,5 14,6 100,0
Serbia & Montenegro 89,3 27,0 99,4 89,1 0,0 100,0
7. BIH-BUL Bosnia Herzegovina 91,5 42,0 99,5 75,9 7,9 97,1
Bulgaria 88,9 24,6 99,3 95,6 0,0 97,6
8. BIH-CRO Bosnia Herzegovina 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Croatia 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
9. BIH-MAC Bosnia Herzegovina 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Macedonia 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
10. BIH-MOL Bosnia Herzegovina 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Moldova 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0
11. BIH-ROM Bosnia Herzegovina 91,8 43,3 99,6 83,7 61,3 100,0
Romania 88,7 28,4 98,5 89,9 0,0 100,0
12. BIH-S&M Bosnia Herzegovina 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Serbia & Montenegro 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
13. BUL-CRO Bulgaria 93,9 59,8 99,3 95,6 17,8 100,0
Croatia 94,5 62,1 99,7 91,7 79,1 100,0
14. BUL-MAC Bulgaria 87,7 10,9 100,0 89,1 0,8 100,0
Macedonia 86,3 0,3 100,0 87,2 0,0 100,0
15. BUL-ROM Bulgaria 94,6 61,5 100,0 98,0 48,1 100,0
Romania 94,6 62,1 99,8 94,4 58,6 100,0
16. BUL-S&M Bulgaria 88,4 19,3 99,6 87,4 45,1 99,7
Serbia & Montenegro 87,6 15,0 99,4 94,0 2,5 99,9
17. CRO-MAC Croatia 99,1 93,3 100,0 87,8 26,6 100,0
Macedonia 99,3 94,9 100,0 88,8 58,7 100,0
18. CRO-ROM Croatia 88,1 14,2 99,9 47,8 0,4 100,0
Romania 87,6 11,2 99,8 71,4 0,5 100,0
19. CRO-S&M Croatia 94,7 62,1 100,0 90,3 54,3 100,0
Serbia & Montenegro 93,9 59,8 99,4 77,6 13,6 99,9
20. MAC-ROM Macedonia 84,9 0,3 98,6 86,0 0,0 100,0
Romania 86,3 10,3 98,6 59,8 0,0 100,0
21. MAC-S&M Macedonia 100,0 100,0 100,0 99,9 100,0 99,8
Serbia & Montenegro 100,0 100,0 100,0 99,9 100,0 99,9
22. MOL-ROM Moldova 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Romania 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
23. ROM-S&M Romania 88,8 22,4 99,6 89,9 3,4 100,0
Serbia & Montenegro 88,5 20,3 99,5 96,9 1,0 99,9
Data: national statistics, bilateral imports 2002 (2001 for Serbia&Montenegro). Imports for Bosnia Herzegovina are replaced by partner country's exports. 
Missing bilateral imports data are replaced by world imports. Agriculture: HS chapters 1 to 24 - Manufacturing: HS chapters 25 to 97.
Share of HS tariff lines freed (%) Share of bilateral imports liberalized (%)
1
Table 4
Table 5. Average trade coverage by ISIC sector
ISIC codes ISIC items measured by the share of HS lines freed
measured by the share of 
bilaterl imports liberalized
1 2 3 4
111 Agriculture 59,9 40,3
121 Forestry 74,9 92,0
122 Logging 100,0 100,0
130 Fisheries 57,2 65,6
210 Coal mining 100,0 100,0
220 Petroleum, Natural Gas 100,0 100,0
230 Other mining 100,0 100,0
290 Stone, salt, etc. 100,0 100,0
311 Food products 46,7 49,9
312 Other food products 50,6 46,1
313 Beverages 35,8 38,4
314 Tobacco 29,7 41,2
321 Textiles 99,4 100,0
322 Wearing Apparel 100,0 100,0
323 Leather & Products 100,0 100,0
324 Footwear 100,0 100,0
331 Wood Products 99,4 100,0
332 Furniture & fixtures 100,0 100,0
341 Paper & Products 100,0 100,0
342 Printing & Publishing 100,0 100,0
351 Industrial Chemicals 99,7 99,0
352 Other Chemicals 97,0 99,8
353 Petroleum Refineries 100,0 100,0
354 Petroleum & Coal Products 100,0 100,0
355 Rubber Products 100,0 100,0
356 Plastic Products, nec 100,0 100,0
361 Pottery, China, etc. 100,0 100,0
362 Glass & Products 100,0 100,0
369 Non-metallic Products 100,0 100,0
371 Iron & Steel 99,7 99,9
372 Non-Ferrous Metals 100,0 100,0
381 Metal  Products 100,0 100,0
382 Machinery 100,0 100,0
383 Electrical Machinery 100,0 100,0
384 Transport Equipment 99,9 99,8
385 Professional Goods 100,0 100,0
390 Other industries 98,6 98,7
400 Electricity 100,0 100,0
All 92,7 87,8
Average trade coverage (%)
Average trade coverage is the arithmetic mean of the 23 FTAs in the database. ISIC codes in Column 1 are ISIC rev.2. 
Import data: bilateral imports 2002 (2001 for Serbia&Montenegro). Imports for Bosnia Herzegovina are replaced by 
partner country's exports. Missing bilateral imports data are replaced by world imports.
Table 5
2905 43 4301 30 7209 27
2905 44 4301 60 7209 28
2905 45 4301 70 7209 90
2939 11 4301 80 7211 14
3301 11 4301 90 7211 19
3301 12 4501 10 7211 23
3301 13 4501 90 7211 29
3301 14 5001 00 7211 90
3301 19 5002 00 8702 10
3301 21 5003 10 8702 90
3301 22 5003 90
3301 23 5101 11
3301 24 5101 19
3301 25 5101 21
3301 26 5101 29
3301 29 5101 30
3301 30 5102 11
3301 90 5102 19
3302 10 5102 20
3501 10 5103 10
3501 90 5103 20
3502 11 5103 30
3502 19 5201 00
3502 20 5202 10
3502 90 5202 91
3503 00 5202 99
3504 00 5203 00
3505 10 5301 10
3505 20 5301 21
3809 10 5301 29
3809 91 5301 30
3809 92 5302 10
3809 93 5302 90
3823 11 7208 10
3823 12 7208 25
3823 13 7208 26
3823 19 7208 27
3823 70 7208 36
3824 60 7208 37
4101 20 7208 38
4101 50 7208 39
4101 90 7208 40
4102 10 7208 51
4102 21 7208 52
4102 29 7208 53
4103 10 7208 54
4103 20 7209 16
4103 30 7209 17
4103 90 7209 18
4301 10 7209 26
¹ This list of 110 HS lines includes the exemptions from all the 23 FTAs. 25 products in this list are 
exemptions for only one of the 46 FTAs' signatories. The others are common to several signatories 
(between 2 and 28 with an average of 7).
Table 6 - List of industrial goods excluded from liberalization in at least one FTA¹
(HS 2002 codes)
Table 6
Table 7 - Concessions in agriculture
FTAs freed(incl. MFN)
TRQs
0%
TRQs
pref. duty rate
Max. or pref. 
duty rates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. ALB-BIH X 283 / 375 - - -
2. ALB-BUL X 37 / 80 51 / 78 - -
3. ALB-CRO X 37 / 97 68 / 54 - -
4. ALB-MAC X X 305 / 376 13 / 16 - -
5. ALB-ROM X 39 / 75 30 / 32 - -
6. ALB-S&M X X 214 /197 51 / 50 - -
7. BIH-BUL X 306 / 179 - - -
8. BIH-CRO X All (729) - - -
9. BIH-MAC X All (729) - - -
10. BIH-MOL X All (729) - - -
11. BIH-ROM X 316 / 207 - - -
12. BIH-S&M X All (729) - - -
13. BUL-CRO X X X X 444 / 680  1 / 2 27 / 39 145 / 145
14. BUL-MAC X X 78 / 2 24 / 22 61 / 45 -
15. BUL-ROM X X X 448 / 453 - 11 / 12 147 / 147
16. BUL-S&M X X X 141 / 109 71 / 71 85 / 85 -
17. CRO-MAC X X 680 / 692 42 / 28
18. CRO-ROM X X 97 / 76 4 / 2 22 / 20 -
19. CRO-S&M X X X X 453 / 436 4 / 4 153 / 153 119 / 119
20. MAC-ROM X X 2 / 75 12 / 11 2 / 2 -
21. MAC-S&M X All (729) - - -
22. MOL-ROM X All (729) - - -
23. ROM-S&M X X 163 / 148 - 63 / 63
¹ 'Partial liberalization' means that a FTA liberalizes a limited number of HS lines in addition to the lines already freed at the multilateral level.
TRQs
preferential duty 
rate within quota
Maximum or 
preferential
duty rates 
(without quota)
Number of HS6 (2002) lines (for each signatory)
Full 
liberalization
Partial 
liberalization¹
TRQs
0% within 
quota
0101 10 0307 60 0804 50 1201 00 1302 31 1605 90
0101 90 0307 91 0805 40 1202 10 1302 32 1702 11
0102 10 0307 99 0805 90 1202 20 1302 39 1702 50
0103 10 0501 00 0806 20 1203 00 1401 10 1801 00
0104 10 0502 10 0813 40 1204 00 1401 20 1802 00
0104 20 0502 90 0814 00 1205 10 1401 90 1803 10
0105 19 0503 00 0901 11 1205 90 1402 00 1803 20
0106 11 0504 00 0901 12 1207 10 1403 00 1804 00
0106 12 0505 10 0901 90 1207 20 1404 10 1805 00
0106 19 0505 90 0902 10 1207 30 1404 20 1901 10
0106 20 0506 10 0902 20 1207 40 1404 90 1903 00
0106 31 0506 90 0902 30 1207 50 1502 00 2103 10
0106 32 0507 10 0902 40 1207 60 1504 10 2301 10
0106 39 0507 90 0903 00 1207 99 1504 20 2301 20
0106 90 0508 00 0904 11 1208 10 1504 30 2302 50
0208 10 0509 00 0904 12 1208 90 1505 00 2303 10
0208 20 0510 00 0904 20 1209 10 1506 00 2303 20
0208 30 0511 10 0905 00 1209 21 1508 10 2303 30
0208 40 0511 91 0906 10 1209 22 1508 90 2304 00
0208 50 0511 99 0906 20 1209 23 1509 10 2305 00
0208 90 0601 10 0907 00 1209 24 1509 90 2306 10
0302 12 0601 20 0908 10 1209 25 1511 10 2306 20
0302 21 0602 10 0908 20 1209 26 1511 90 2306 30
0302 22 0602 20 0908 30 1209 29 1513 11 2306 41
0302 23 0602 30 0909 10 1209 30 1513 19 2306 49
0302 29 0602 40 0909 20 1209 91 1513 21 2306 50
0302 31 0602 90 0909 30 1209 99 1513 29 2306 60
0302 32 0604 10 0909 40 1210 10 1515 11 2306 70
0302 33 0604 91 0909 50 1210 20 1515 19 2306 90
0302 34 0604 99 0910 10 1211 10 1515 21 2307 00
0302 35 0713 40 0910 20 1211 20 1515 30 2308 00
0302 36 0713 90 0910 30 1211 40 1515 40 2309 90
0302 39 0714 10 0910 40 1211 90 1515 50
0302 40 0714 20 0910 50 1212 10 1515 90
0302 50 0714 90 0910 91 1212 20 1518 00
0302 61 0801 11 0910 99 1212 30 1520 00
0302 62 0801 19 1006 10 1212 91 1521 10
0302 63 0801 21 1006 20 1212 99 1521 90
0302 64 0801 22 1006 30 1213 00 1522 00
0302 65 0801 31 1006 40 1214 10 1603 00
0302 66 0801 32 1007 00 1214 90 1604 11
0307 10 0802 11 1008 10 1301 10 1604 12
0307 21 0802 12 1008 20 1301 20 1604 16
0307 29 0802 21 1008 30 1301 90 1604 19
0307 31 0802 22 1008 90 1302 11 1604 20
0307 39 0802 50 1102 30 1302 12 1604 30
0307 41 0802 90 1106 10 1302 13 1605 10
0307 49 0804 10 1106 20 1302 14 1605 20
0307 51 0804 20 1106 30 1302 19 1605 30
0307 59 0804 40 1109 00 1302 20 1605 40
Table 8 - List of agricultural products that are liberalized in a majority of FTAs¹
(HS 2002 codes)
¹ Each product in this list is liberalized by at least 54% of the 46 FTAs' signatories (at most 93% and on 
average 67%). The 282 HS lines thus obtained represent a trade coverage in agriculture of 38,7% that is 
sufficient to fulfill the MoU trade coverage criteria (with a full liberalization of industrial goods).
Table 8
Table 9. The FTAs: Key provisions mentioned by the MoU, as of May 2003
Signatories ALB-BIH ALB-BUL ALB-CRO ALB-S&M ALB-MAC ALB-ROM BIH-BUL BIH-CRO BIH-S&M BIH-MAC BIH-MOL BIH-ROM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Year [a] i2002 i2002 s2002 i2002 a2002 s2003 i2003 a2001 a2002 a2002 s2002 i2002
Number of words 5895 5455 5516 5561 5360 4974 6320 5685 5169 6142 5420 5856
1. Non-tariff barriers
Rules of origin 15,34 23 24 25 25 15 17 16 12 24 18 17
reference to PanEur rules yes [b] [b] [b] [b] [b] yes yes yes yes yes yes
ref. to custom cooperation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standards (TBT) 7 8 8 9 9 9 16 8 8 8 7 16
reference to WTO yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standards (SPS) 14 13 14 15 15 14 15 14 11 14 15 15
reference to WTO yes yes -- yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
reference to EC harmoniz. yes yes -- yes yes -- yes yes yes yes -- --
2. Contingent protection
Safeguard
specific (agriculture) 13 12 13 14 14 13 14 13 10 13 14 14
reference to WTO -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- yes
general 26,30 17,20 19,22 20,23 20,23 26,30 28,32 27,31 23,27 20,23 29 28,32
reference to WTO -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- yes -- -- yes
Antidumping 25 16 18 19 19 26 27,32 26,31 22,27 19,23 28 27,32
reference to WTO yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Subsidies and CVDs 22,30 16 28,22 19 19 22,30 27,32 23,31 19,27 27,23 24,26 28,32
reference to WTO yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
3. Competition rules
Competition provisions 21,30 25 27,22 27 27 21,30 23 22,31 18,27 26 23,26 23,32
reference to EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
state monopolies 19 19 21 22 22 19 21 20 16 -- 21 21
State aid 22,30 25 28,22 28 27 22,30 24,27 23,31 19,27 27,23 24,26 24,32
reference to WTO yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
reference to EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
4. Behind the border agenda
Public procurement 23 28 31 31 30 23 25 24 20 28 25 25
liberalization yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
reference to WTO yes yes yes yes yes -- yes yes yes yes -- --
Services 33 32 32 32 31 32 37 36 31 -- -- 34
liberalization yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes -- -- yes
reference to WTO yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes -- -- yes
reference to EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- yes
TRIPs 24 27 30 30 29 24 26 25 21 30 27 26
reference to WTO yes yes yes yes yes yes yes -- -- yes yes yes
Table 9
Table 9 (end). The FTAs: Key provisions mentioned by the MoU, as of May 2003
Signatories BUL-S&M BUL-ROM BUL-CRO BUL-MAC CRO-S&M CRO-MAC CRO-ROM S&M-MAC S&M-ROM MAC-ROM MOL-ROM
13 14 [*] 15 16 17 18 19 [*] 20 21 22 23
Year [a] i2003 a2002 a2000 s2002 a1997 a2003 a1996 s2003 s2003 a1994
Number of words 5690 1466 5480 5565 5006 5142 2674 5117 5099 3531
1. Non-tariff barriers
Rules of origin 16 -- 15 25 15 15 -- 10 15 16 9
reference to PanEur rules -- -- -- [b] -- [b] -- -- -- [b] [b]
ref. to custom cooperation -- -- yes yes yes yes -- -- yes yes yes
Standards (TBT) 10 -- 9 10 -- 9 -- 8 9 10 --
reference to WTO yes -- yes yes -- -- -- -- yes yes --
Standards (SPS) 15 -- 14 15 14 14 -- 9 14 15 11
reference to WTO -- -- -- yes -- -- -- -- yes yes --
reference to EC harmoniz. -- -- -- yes -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2. Contingent protection
Safeguard
specific (agriculture) 14 -- 13 14 13 13 -- -- 13 14 --
reference to WTO -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
general 27,31 -- 26,30 20,23 26,29 26,30 -- 17,19 26,3 27,31 21,25
reference to WTO -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Antidumping 26,31 -- 25,30 19,23 25,29 25,30 -- 16,19 25,30 26,31 20,25
reference to WTO yes -- yes yes yes yes -- -- yes yes --
Subsidies and CVDs -- -- 22,30 27,23 -- -- -- 16,19 -- 23,31 17,25
reference to WTO -- -- yes yes -- -- -- yes -- yes --
3. Competition rules
Competition provisions 22,31 -- 21,30 27,23 21,29 21,31 -- -- 21,3 22,31 16
reference to EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
state monopolies 20 -- 19 22 19 19 -- -- 19 20 14
State aid 23,31 -- 22,30 27,23 22,29 22,31 -- 16,19 22,30 23,31 17,25
reference to WTO -- -- yes yes yes yes -- -- yes yes --
reference to EC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
4. Behind the border agenda
Public procurement 24 -- 23 30 23 23 -- -- 23 24 18
liberalization yes -- yes yes yes yes -- -- yes yes yes
reference to WTO yes -- yes yes -- yes -- -- -- -- --
Services 36 -- 35 -- 34 -- -- -- 32 33 --
liberalization yes -- yes -- yes -- -- -- yes yes --
reference to WTO yes -- yes -- yes -- -- -- yes yes --
reference to EC -- -- -- -- yes -- -- -- yes -- --
TRIPs 25 -- 24 29 24 24 -- 14 24 25 19
reference to WTO yes -- yes yes yes -- -- -- yes yes --
Sources: The Free trade agreements.  Note [*] The BUL-ROM and CRO-ROM agreements are the accession treaties of Bulgaria and Croatia to CEFTA.
Notes: [a] i=initialled, s=signed, a=applied. [b] These provisions are included in the protocols.
Table 9
Table 10. The FTAs: Key provisions mentioned by the MoU, as of May 2003 (provisional results)
Signatories ALB-BIH ALB-BUL ALB-CRO ALB-S&M ALB-MAC ALB-ROM BIH-BUL BIH-CRO BIH-S&M BIH-MAC BIH-MOL BIH-ROM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Year [a] i2002 i2002 s2002 i2002 a2002 s2003 i2003 a2001 a2002 a2002 s2002 i2002
Number of words 5895 5455 5516 5561 5360 4974 6320 5685 5169 6142 5420 5856
Nbr words on safeguards 1519 1459 1538 1435 1385 1452 1522 1367 1498 1518 1380 1481
Share (%) 25,8 26,7 27,9 25,8 25,8 29,2 24,1 24,0 29,0 24,7 25,5 25,3
1. Agriculture and special safeguard
Agricultural policy [b] yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Special safeguard [c] 1-4 1-3 1-4 1-4 1-3 1-3 1-4 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3
2. General safeguard and associates
General safeguard [d] 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-7 1-6 1-6 1-7
Structural adjustement [e] 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-3,5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5 1-5
Re-export [f] 1 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1 1 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1
Balance of payments [g] 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1 1 1 1 1-2 1 1
3. Antidumping and countervailing measures
Antidumping and CVD [h] 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Signatories BUL-S&M BUL-ROM BUL-CRO BUL-MAC CRO-S&M CRO-MAC CRO-ROM S&M-MAC S&M-ROM MAC-ROM MOL-ROM
13 14 [*] 15 16 17 18 19 [*] 20 21 22 23
Year [a] i2003 a2002 a2000 s2002 a1997 a2003 a1996 s2003 s2003 a1994
Number of words 5690 1466 5480 5565 5006 5142 2674 5117 5099 3531
Nbr words on safeguards 1503 -- 1377 1500 1198 1638 -- 747 1490 1461 1018
Share (%) 26,4 -- 25,1 27,0 23,9 31,9 -- 27,9 29,1 28,7 28,8
1. Agriculture and special safeguard
Agricultural policy [b] yes -- yes yes yes yes -- no yes yes no
Special safeguard [c] 1-3 -- 1-4 1-3 1-4 1-4 -- -- 1-4 1-3 --
2. General safeguard and associates
General safeguard [d] 1-6 -- 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 -- 1-7 1-6 1-6 1-6
Structural adjustement [e] 1-5 -- 1-5 1-5 no 1-5 -- no 1-6 1-5 1-5
Re-export [f] 1-3 -- 1 1-3 1-2 1 -- no 1 1 1
Balance of payments [g] 1 -- 1 1-2 1 1 -- 1 1 1 3
3. Antidumping and countervailing measures
Antidumping and CVD [h] 1 -- 1 1 1 1 -- 1-2 1 1 3
Sources: The Free trade agreements.  Note [*] The BUL-ROM and CRO-ROM agreements are the accession treaties of Bulgaria and Croatia to CEFTA.
Notes [a] i=initialled, s=signed, a=applied.
[b] yes=notification of changes of agricultural policy; no=no notification.
[c] 1=consultation required, 2=serious disturbances, 3=immediate measures, 4=proportionality.
[d] 1=import surge, 2=serious injury, 3=like-product, 4=directly competitive product, 5=serious disturbances, 6=regional injury, 7=reference to the WTO safeguard provision.
[e] 1=infant industry, 2=cap on the tariff, 3=cap on the import coverage, 4=limited to the implementation period, 5=reference to the Joint Committee.
[f] 1=measures to be taken, 2=non-discriminatory measures, 3=no longer than necessary.
[g] 1=measures to be taken, 2=limited duration, 3=not to go beyond.
[h] 1=only antidumping, 2=antidumping and CVD, 3=non classifiable.
[g] 1=reference to GATT/WTO, 2=reference to IMF, 3=non classifiable.
Table 10
Table 11. Average tariffs, by country, HS product group and ISIC sector
Country Albania Bosnia Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Moldova Romania Serbia &
HS or Herzegovina Montenegro
HS96 HS02 ISIC3 year / nomenclature 2002 (HS96) 2002 (HS02) 2002 (HS02) 2002 (HS02) 2002 (HS02) 2002 (HS96) 2002 (HS02) 2002 (HS96)
1. Overall indicators
All products - average ad valorem tariff 7,4 6,0 9,7 5,0 12,6 5,0 17,1 9,4
5113 5224 Number of tariff lines (HS6) 5113 5224 5224 5224 5224 5113 5224 5113
Number of lines with specific tariffs 0 161 74 131 79 30 0 124
% of lines freed at the MFN level 2,0 26,2 13,9 45,3 0,9 44,9 7,0 0,0
2. Average tariffs by HS product groups
704 729 HS 1-24 Agriculture 9,5 5,0 16,7 10,2 20,8 10,1 23,1 16,9
4409 4494 HS25-97 Manufacturing 7,0 6,2 8,6 4,2 11,2 4,2 16,1 8,2
3. Average tariffs by ISIC sector
213 218 111 Agriculture 7,6 3,0 12,0 7,2 17,7 9,5 17,4 12,5
19 17 121 Forestry 9,6 0,3 0,3 3,6 1,6 9,5 4,8 3,7
8 8 122 Logging 2,0 0,6 0,0 0,0 2,0 0,0 6,4 1,0
49 53 130 Fisheries 13,5 1,8 8,9 6,6 13,5 9,7 18,9 11,0
4 4 210 Coal mining 8,0 1,3 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,0
3 3 220 Petroleum, Natural Gas 4,7 3,3 5,2 3,3 3,6 0,0 10,5 4,6
23 23 230 Other mining 2,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 2,0 0,0 2,4 1,0
75 73 290 Stone, salt, etc. 2,3 0,8 1,0 3,6 9,4 3,7 5,9 3,3
363 378 311 Food products 8,8 6,0 20,2 11,2 21,8 10,2 25,1 19,3
55 54 312 Other food products 10,1 4,5 17,9 9,7 16,4 8,7 21,5 15,0
24 24 313 Beverages 14,0 12,7 13,9 25,7 46,5 3,8 79,9 28,0
6 6 314 Tobacco 11,7 15,0 15,0 26,9 52,5 7,5 93,0 22,5
681 707 321 Textiles 8,8 9,8 15,5 7,9 18,0 6,8 22,9 12,5
134 134 322 Wearing Apparel 14,8 14,6 21,0 14,1 33,9 14,8 28,9 26,8
48 53 323 Leather & Products 11,3 7,1 7,3 6,2 17,4 9,8 13,3 12,7
17 17 324 Footwear 13,8 14,4 20,3 11,3 26,1 11,5 23,5 19,4
64 67 331 Wood Products 8,8 4,9 9,0 2,5 11,3 1,9 12,8 7,5
22 22 332 Furniture & fixtures 13,8 9,5 15,6 9,7 24,7 10,3 19,3 19,1
118 120 341 Paper & Products 9,2 5,1 8,3 2,9 9,1 3,4 13,0 6,8
29 29 342 Printing & Publishing 7,6 6,3 6,0 1,8 19,3 9,7 8,4 12,1
683 689 351 Industrial Chemicals 3,4 2,7 7,1 1,2 5,0 3,1 14,9 3,2
243 264 352 Other Chemicals 5,6 4,2 6,4 2,5 9,1 3,0 18,4 5,0
14 17 353 Petroleum Refineries 8,5 1,4 11,0 7,8 8,4 0,4 9,3 3,2
13 13 354 Petroleum & Coal Products 11,4 1,5 4,3 3,6 5,3 1,6 7,4 4,8
62 76 355 Rubber Products 11,8 8,7 11,7 4,3 11,6 6,8 18,3 13,1
22 22 356 Plastic Products, nec 14,0 12,6 14,7 6,4 20,9 4,0 18,3 18,7
15 15 361 Pottery, China, etc. 9,8 8,4 16,1 6,3 25,5 13,2 20,1 15,1
66 63 362 Glass & Products 9,1 8,4 11,9 5,2 11,5 9,5 15,0 10,2
83 79 369 Non-metallic Products 11,7 5,7 9,0 7,2 18,5 10,0 10,8 9,4
205 204 371 Iron & Steel 9,2 4,0 4,9 0,6 4,9 0,0 15,9 3,1
164 182 372 Non-Ferrous Metals 7,1 2,6 3,6 1,1 6,9 0,0 7,1 4,8
219 218 381 Metal  Products 11,4 8,9 10,1 7,4 13,6 3,4 17,2 11,0
505 506 382 Machinery 2,7 6,1 5,9 2,9 7,1 0,9 13,3 6,4
290 288 383 Electrical Machinery 6,0 7,0 6,8 3,1 10,8 3,9 11,6 8,4
146 148 384 Transport Equipment 4,1 5,6 5,0 5,6 8,5 2,8 19,4 5,8
220 222 385 Professional Goods 6,2 5,2 5,2 1,2 9,5 4,3 11,0 5,7
207 207 390 Other industries 11,8 7,7 7,3 4,8 13,9 6,9 16,9 13,2
289 296 111-130 Agriculture 8,6 2,5 10,5 6,7 15,6 9,2 16,6 11,3
105 103 210-290 In-between 2,5 0,7 0,9 2,6 7,2 2,6 5,0 2,8
4718 4824 311-390 Manufacture 7,4 6,4 9,9 4,9 12,5 4,8 17,4 9,4
1 1 400 Electricity 2,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,0 1,0
Nbr of items
Table 11
ISIC Country Alb Alb Alb Alb Alb Alb BiH BiH BiH BiH BiH BiH BiH Bul Bul Bul Bul Bul Bul Cro Cro Cro Cro Cro
codes ISIC items                      w/ BiH Bul Cro Mac Rom S&M Alb Bul Cro Mac Mol Rom S&M Alb BiH Cro Mac Rom S&M Alb BiH Bul Mac Rom
111 Agriculture 37,2 9,2 5,2 54,9 8,3 40,4 61,0 61,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 60,6 100,0 23,4 47,7 68,5 23,9 71,6 45,9 27,2 100,0 73,2 96,8 31,9
121 Forestry 70,6 11,8 10,5 100,0 11,8 70,6 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 94,1 100,0 100,0 94,7 100,0 100,0 15,8 100,0 100,0 100,0 15,8
122 Logging 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
130 Fisheries 83,0 11,3 10,2 12,2 11,3 13,2 90,6 83,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 83,0 100,0 13,2 13,2 98,0 12,2 98,1 13,2 12,2 100,0 98,0 100,0 12,2
210 Coal mining 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
220 Petroleum, Natural Gas 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
230 Other mining 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
290 Stone, salt, etc. 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
311 Food products 38,6 10,8 11,8 37,2 11,4 28,0 44,2 27,8 100,0 100,0 100,0 29,9 100,0 6,1 14,8 55,1 7,7 56,6 9,0 9,6 100,0 55,6 90,7 12,7
312 Other food products 31,5 0,0 0,0 52,7 0,0 37,0 46,3 38,9 100,0 100,0 100,0 38,9 100,0 5,6 29,6 45,5 10,9 48,1 7,4 18,2 100,0 58,2 96,3 20,0
313 Beverages 20,8 0,0 0,0 45,8 0,0 8,3 25,0 4,2 100,0 100,0 100,0 4,2 100,0 0,0 4,2 12,5 0,0 12,5 0,0 0,0 100,0 12,5 83,3 0,0
314 Tobacco 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 0,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 0,0 83,3 0,0
321 Textiles 99,4 99,2 96,8 99,3 97,2 99,4 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 99,3 99,9 99,4 99,7 100,0 99,9 99,1 100,0 99,6 100,0 99,1
322 Wearing Apparel 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
323 Leather & Products 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
324 Footwear 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
331 Wood Products 97,0 97,0 100,0 96,9 100,0 97,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 97,0 100,0 96,9 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
332 Furniture & fixtures 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
341 Paper & Products 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
342 Printing & Publishing 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
351 Industrial Chemicals 99,3 98,8 99,7 99,6 99,7 99,3 99,6 99,4 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 98,8 99,1 98,5 100,0 100,0 99,1 100,0 100,0 99,6 100,0 100,0
352 Other Chemicals 97,0 95,5 88,9 97,5 89,8 96,6 97,0 96,2 100,0 100,0 100,0 97,3 100,0 96,2 90,5 97,1 98,4 99,6 97,0 91,4 100,0 98,8 100,0 97,9
353 Petroleum Refineries 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
354 Petroleum & Coal Products 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
355 Rubber Products 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
356 Plastic Products, nec 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
361 Pottery, China, etc. 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
362 Glass & Products 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
369 Non-metallic Products 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
371 Iron & Steel 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
372 Non-Ferrous Metals 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
381 Metal  Products 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
382 Machinery 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
383 Electrical Machinery 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
384 Transport Equipment 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
385 Professional Goods 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
390 Other industries 97,1 94,7 94,7 99,0 94,7 97,6 99,5 99,5 100,0 100,0 100,0 99,5 100,0 99,0 99,5 99,5 99,0 100,0 99,5 99,0 100,0 99,5 100,0 99,0
400 Electricity 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
All 91,0 86,2 85,7 91,6 85,8 89,7 93,0 91,5 100,0 100,0 100,0 91,8 100,0 87,0 88,9 93,9 87,7 94,6 88,4 87,4 100,0 94,5 99,1 88,1
ISIC rev. 2. Each percentage represents the share of tariff lines liberalized by the country in the first line when importing goods of the ISIC sector reported originating in the country in the second line.
Table 12. FTA coverage, by country and ISIC sector: tariff line-based indicators
Table 12
ISIC Country
codes ISIC items                      w/
111 Agriculture
121 Forestry
122 Logging
130 Fisheries
210 Coal mining
220 Petroleum, Natural Gas
230 Other mining
290 Stone, salt, etc.
311 Food products
312 Other food products
313 Beverages
314 Tobacco
321 Textiles
322 Wearing Apparel
323 Leather & Products
324 Footwear
331 Wood Products
332 Furniture & fixtures
341 Paper & Products
342 Printing & Publishing
351 Industrial Chemicals
352 Other Chemicals
353 Petroleum Refineries
354 Petroleum & Coal Products
355 Rubber Products
356 Plastic Products, nec
361 Pottery, China, etc.
362 Glass & Products
369 Non-metallic Products
371 Iron & Steel
372 Non-Ferrous Metals
381 Metal  Products
382 Machinery
383 Electrical Machinery
384 Transport Equipment
385 Professional Goods
390 Other industries
400 Electricity
All
Cro Mac Mac Mac Mac Mac Mac Mol Mol Rom Rom Rom Rom Rom Rom Rom S&M S&M S&M S&M S&M S&M Mean
S&M Alb BiH Bul Cro Rom S&M BiH Rom Alb BiH Bul Cro Mac Mol S&M Alb BiH Bul Cro Mac Rom
71,6 54,9 100,0 12,7 97,7 4,6 100,0 100,0 100,0 31,2 48,6 72,0 35,7 26,6 100,0 54,6 40,4 100,0 37,6 71,1 100,0 50,0 59,9
100,0 100,0 100,0 10,5 100,0 11,8 100,0 100,0 100,0 11,8 100,0 100,0 10,5 11,8 100,0 11,8 70,6 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 11,8 74,9
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
90,6 100,0 100,0 6,1 100,0 7,5 100,0 100,0 100,0 7,5 13,2 98,1 6,1 7,5 100,0 7,5 9,4 100,0 9,4 90,6 100,0 7,5 57,2
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
54,5 45,5 100,0 3,0 93,4 1,6 100,0 100,0 100,0 5,6 14,3 56,6 6,9 5,3 100,0 12,7 24,1 100,0 5,6 50,3 100,0 11,6 46,7
72,2 60,0 100,0 7,3 96,3 1,9 100,0 100,0 100,0 16,7 35,2 51,9 20,0 16,7 100,0 27,8 37,0 100,0 3,7 72,2 100,0 24,1 50,6
33,3 29,2 100,0 0,0 83,3 0,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 0,0 4,2 12,5 0,0 0,0 100,0 4,2 8,3 100,0 0,0 33,3 100,0 4,2 35,8
0,0 0,0 100,0 0,0 83,3 0,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 0,0 29,7
100,0 99,3 100,0 99,6 100,0 97,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 97,5 97,3 99,4 99,3 97,2 100,0 99,4 99,4 100,0 99,3 100,0 100,0 99,4 99,4
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 98,4 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 97,0 100,0 97,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 99,4
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 99,6 100,0 100,0 100,0 99,7 100,0 100,0 100,0 99,7 99,7 100,0 100,0 99,7 100,0 99,3 99,3 100,0 98,8 100,0 100,0 99,3 99,7
100,0 97,9 100,0 97,5 100,0 89,4 100,0 100,0 100,0 89,8 91,7 99,6 97,5 89,8 100,0 96,2 96,6 100,0 96,6 100,0 100,0 96,2 97,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 87,7 100,0 100,0 99,7
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 98,6 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 98,6 100,0 99,9
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 99,0 100,0 94,7 100,0 94,7 100,0 100,0 100,0 95,2 99,5 100,0 95,2 95,2 100,0 97,1 97,6 100,0 99,5 100,0 100,0 97,1 98,6
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
94,7 93,1 100,0 86,3 99,3 84,9 100,0 100,0 100,0 86,5 88,7 94,6 87,6 86,3 100,0 88,8 89,3 100,0 87,6 93,9 100,0 88,5 92,7
Table 12
ISIC Country Alb Alb Alb Alb Alb Alb BiH BiH BiH BiH BiH BiH BiH Bul Bul Bul Bul Bul Bul Cro Cro Cro Cro Cro
codes ISIC items                      w/ BiH Bul Cro Mac Rom S&M Alb Bul Cro Mac Mol Rom S&M Alb BiH Cro Mac Rom S&M Alb BiH Bul Mac Rom
111 Agriculture - 0,0 0,0 7,3 0,0 0,3 0,0 2,5 100,0 100,0 100,0 99,8 100,0 - - 87,8 33,3 87,4 12,2 0,0 100,0 22,7 11,4 0,4
121 Forestry - - - - - - - 100,0 100,0 - - - 100,0 - - - 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - -
122 Logging - - - - - - - - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 - - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - -
130 Fisheries - - - 0,0 - - - 0,0 100,0 - - - 100,0 - - - - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - - -
210 Coal mining - - - - - - - - - - - - 100,0 - - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - -
220 Petroleum, Natural Gas - - 100,0 100,0 - - - - 100,0 - - - - - - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - - - - -
230 Other mining - - - - - - - - - - - - 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - -
290 Stone, salt, etc. - 100,0 - 100,0 - - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
311 Food products 86,6 0,0 0,0 27,6 96,7 21,1 100,0 10,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 0,4 100,0 - - 5,1 84,2 52,6 89,1 0,0 100,0 82,8 73,3 0,0
312 Other food products - 0,0 0,0 95,0 0,0 - - 0,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 0,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 45,8 0,0 - 100,0 44,0 15,0 0,0
313 Beverages - 0,0 0,0 24,7 0,0 9,3 - 0,0 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 - - - 0,0 4,9 0,0 - 100,0 0,0 3,0 -
314 Tobacco 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 - - - - 100,0 100,0 - - - - - - 0,0 - - - - - - -
321 Textiles - 100,0 100,0 99,8 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
322 Wearing Apparel - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
323 Leather & Products - - - - - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
324 Footwear - 100,0 - 100,0 - - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
331 Wood Products 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
332 Furniture & fixtures 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
341 Paper & Products - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
342 Printing & Publishing 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
351 Industrial Chemicals - 99,8 100,0 99,3 100,0 100,0 - 78,8 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 82,5 100,0 100,0 100,0 98,4 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
352 Other Chemicals 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 99,4 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 99,8 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
353 Petroleum Refineries - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - - - - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
354 Petroleum & Coal Products 100,0 - - 100,0 - - - - 100,0 - - - 100,0 - - - 100,0 - - - 100,0 - - -
355 Rubber Products - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
356 Plastic Products, nec - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
361 Pottery, China, etc. - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
362 Glass & Products - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
369 Non-metallic Products - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
371 Iron & Steel 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
372 Non-Ferrous Metals - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
381 Metal  Products 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
382 Machinery - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
383 Electrical Machinery 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
384 Transport Equipment 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
385 Professional Goods - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
390 Other industries - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
400 Electricity - 100,0 100,0 - - - - - - - - - 100,0 - - - - - - - 100,0 - - -
All 91,7 70,0 95,8 79,5 99,6 37,5 88,6 75,9 100,0 100,0 100,0 83,7 100,0 83,8 95,6 95,6 89,1 98,0 87,4 53,2 100,0 91,7 87,8 47,8
ISIC rev. 2. Each percentage represents the share of imports liberalized by the country in the first line when importing goods of the ISIC sector reported from the country in the second line.
Table 13. FTA coverage, by country and ISIC sector: import-based indicators
Table 13
ISIC Country
codes ISIC items                      w/
111 Agriculture
121 Forestry
122 Logging
130 Fisheries
210 Coal mining
220 Petroleum, Natural Gas
230 Other mining
290 Stone, salt, etc.
311 Food products
312 Other food products
313 Beverages
314 Tobacco
321 Textiles
322 Wearing Apparel
323 Leather & Products
324 Footwear
331 Wood Products
332 Furniture & fixtures
341 Paper & Products
342 Printing & Publishing
351 Industrial Chemicals
352 Other Chemicals
353 Petroleum Refineries
354 Petroleum & Coal Products
355 Rubber Products
356 Plastic Products, nec
361 Pottery, China, etc.
362 Glass & Products
369 Non-metallic Products
371 Iron & Steel
372 Non-Ferrous Metals
381 Metal  Products
382 Machinery
383 Electrical Machinery
384 Transport Equipment
385 Professional Goods
390 Other industries
400 Electricity
All
Cro Mac Mac Mac Mac Mac Mac Mol Mol Rom Rom Rom Rom Rom Rom Rom S&M S&M S&M S&M S&M S&M Mean
S&M Alb BiH Bul Cro Rom S&M BiH Rom Alb BiH Bul Cro Mac Mol S&M Alb BiH Bul Cro Mac Rom
57,4 3,0 100,0 4,8 57,7 0,0 100,0 - 100,0 0,0 0,0 7,4 16,6 0,0 100,0 6,0 0,0 100,0 36,5 23,0 100,0 14,4 40,3
100,0 - - 63,4 - - 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 - - - 0,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 92,0
100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0
100,0 - - 0,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 - 0,0 100,0 - - 100,0 0,0 - 100,0 0,0 47,3 - - 65,6
- - 100,0 - - - 100,0 - - - - - - - - - - 100,0 - - - - 100,0
- - - - 100,0 - - - 100,0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 100,0
- - - - - 100,0 100,0 - - - - - - - - - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
52,4 - 100,0 0,6 57,4 0,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 0,0 81,5 0,0 0,0 100,0 1,7 0,0 100,0 2,1 20,8 100,0 0,0 49,9
92,8 100,0 100,0 0,1 53,3 0,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 52,3 77,5 - 100,0 2,6 0,0 100,0 0,0 74,0 100,0 0,0 46,1
30,2 100,0 - 0,0 99,0 0,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 18,7 - - 100,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 0,0 2,0 100,0 0,0 38,4
- - 100,0 - 0,1 - 100,0 - - - - 0,0 0,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 0,0 0,0 100,0 - 41,2
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0
100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 99,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 99,8 100,0 100,0 93,1 99,8
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 - - - - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 95,7 100,0 100,0 99,9
100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 94,5 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 97,9 100,0 99,8
100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
100,0 75,4 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 99,9 - 100,0 83,6 - 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 95,3 98,7
- - 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 - - - - 100,0 - - - 100,0 - 100,0 100,0 - - 100,0 100,0
90,3 89,6 100,0 87,2 88,8 86,0 99,9 100,0 100,0 82,0 89,9 94,4 71,4 59,8 100,0 89,9 89,1 100,0 94,0 77,6 99,9 96,9 87,8
Table 13
